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July 27, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

VIETNAM
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the chief
issue before our country continues to be
Vietnam. It lnftuences our ability to manage effectively all our concerns and priorities, domestic and foreign. A progression of events since 1954, and even before, has carried us to this place. I do
not believe that It ls inevitable that
events of our decisions must continue to
carry us deeper into an ever increasing
involvement in VIetnam.
On May 15, I made a proposal in the
Senate, which I hoped would enable our
Government to break out of the rigid
cycle of force and counterforce which
ha.s not brought negotiation or peace, but
only a steadily enlarging war.
My propOBltlon wa.s that the United
States should confine Its bombing-in

support of our troops-to 1nflltratlon
routes near the demllltarized zone where
men and supplies enter South VIetnam
over the 17th parallel, or from LaOB and
Cambodia..
The key of the proposal wa.s that the
action of the United States sllould be
without precondition-without the requirement of sbme parallel reciprocity
by the North Vietnamese; without stages
of cessation; without fixing terminal
dates; and not centered upon religious
days, because the purpose of the pause
is unclear.
The unconditional cessation of bombing ha.s been the consistent and Indispensable requirement of North Vietnam for
negotiations. I do not believe there will
be negotiations until the bombing stops,
and uncondition3.lly_
I made the proposal as a way for our
Government to determine whether an
unconditional cessation of the bombing
of North Vietnam would lead to negotiations, a.s has been reported by many
official and private channels, including
Secretary General of the U.N., U Thant
and Premier Kosygin of the Soviet
Union. My proposal was made as an alternative to an escalation of the bombing,
an escalation of forces, and of the total
war, which could reach a point when
North VIetnam would be compelled to
ask the Soviet bloc for volunteers and
Communist China to come to Its aid, and
when China would Intervene to prevent
the defeat of Its Communist neighbor.
Above all, it was-and Is today-a proposal for negotiation, and for an honorable peace, which our country, with the
assurance of Its va.st power, and with the
conviction of its desire for an honorable
peace, can make.
Of course, such a cessation entails serious risks, and they are apparent, but they
are risks that the United States can take.
It Is difficult to belleve that the United
States, with Its overwhelming power,
could not protect the security of our
troops. As I pointed out on May 15, the
risks are not as great as a continuing and
expanding war-with its rising casualties
and oost-the increased support by the
Soviet Union to North VIetnam, the possibility 'Of intervention by Communist
China, and, if that should occur, the possibility of a third world war, with consequences one can scarcely contemplate.
No one can say that our 1n1tlatlve
would be successful, but the retraction
of bombing-like a. curtain of fire pulled
back-would have to be recognized by
North Vietnam, and Its purpose known
by the world.
The decision for peace-not war-will
then have been made by our country.
The choice of peace or war will then pass
to the North Vietnamese and its Communist supporters.
My proposal of May 15 received wide
support from many sources-from Members of the Senate, including the majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, from
the news media, and people throughout
the country. A thoughtful proposal for
cessation--although differing in some
important respects from the one I have
ma.d~has been made by Representative Morse and seven other Members of
the House.
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In referring to our distinguished majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, I have
done so because I know that In 1954,
when it was suggested that the United
States then either send troops into South
Vietnam or use its A1r Force In support
of the French at Dlenbienphu, he pointed
out the danger of the involvement of the
United States in that cotmtry. And year
after year he has continued to point out
the danger of further involvement.
.I have not mentioned in this speech
the suggestion of Senator MANSFIELD
that this matter be refen-ed to the Geneva Conference or to the United Nations, a proposal I have supported, because I wanted to place my emphasis
upon the unconditional cessation of
bombing, which I believe Is indispensable f.:>r the start of negotiations. But 1f
cessation of bombing should occur, and
negotiations are not possible, then, of
course, his position-his urging to submit the question of the war in Vietnam
to the United Nations-should be supported by our Government and by Congress, without reservation.
But soon after May 15, the attention of
the country was focused on the Middle
East. A war has been fought. It was
mercifully short, but It brought costly
destruction and the loss of many livesincluding American lives. It has not
brought peace or security to the Mideast.
The underlying problems remain to be
settled. And as with any war today, there
wa.s concern that It would involve an increa.sing number of countries, Including
our own.
The conflict In the Mideast raised
again, during that period of crisis, the
prospect of a confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union-one
which may have been averted or at least
lessened by the speed of the Israel victory.
The debates in the Security Council
and General Assembly of the United Nations, the conference between President
Johnson and Premier Kosygln at Gla.ssboro, once again laid bare with awesome
clarity the delicate balance between the
two great powers. There have been
incidents only recently which warn that
this balance Is dellcate indeed and could
be upset. Soviet naval vessels have harassed our ships, a.nd Soviet merchant
ships have been strafed In North Vietnam harbors. Doubts about the intentions of each other, and concern for security are leading- and I believe inexorably- to the establlshment of antiballistic missile systems in the Soviet Union
and the United States. These developments, and the possibility of the confrontation about which we were so concerned during the Mideast crisis, demonstrate the Importance of a settlement
in Vietnam.
In making this statement, I do not
place our country on the same plane as
the Soviet Union. I know that the President and the United States sincerely desire peace in Vietnam, and I am not certain that the Soviet Union does.
But despite the dangerous confrontation In the Middle Ea.st-a greater war
was averted. President Johnson acted
with restraint and statesmanship. The
Soviet Union did not intervene with its
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forces after the war began. The Security
CouncU was able to agree on a. resolution
for a cease-fire which was accepted.
There is recognition that the basic problems of the Mideast must be met. And
there grew up at the time the belief, or at
least hope in the world, that steps can be
taken to find peaceful solutions 1n other
dangerous areas, including Southeast

with the general present program; le that
correct?
Secretary McNAMARA. Senator Cue, I do no~
want to !orecaat future milltary operattona.
Senator CAS!:. But this I read ln the newspa.pers, that the U.S. won't modify the VIetnam bomblng. Thls ls In the New York Tlmes
by Wllilam Beecher, JUly 24. "Johnson sa.ld
he would rule out both cutbs and Wider

Asia..

Secretary McNAMARA. I think you would
have to aak Mr. Beecher for his sources. He
did not dlsCUB8 the matter with me, a.nd I
am sure he did not discuss It with President
Johnson.
Senator CASE. So fnr as you know
there ls no Intention or-I am not putting
thls ln personal terms but merely as an
lllustratlon-taking Sen a tor Coopers' advice.
Secretary McNAMARA. I do not mean to be
less thnn candid here, but I should not, I
think, give any Indication or future military
opera tlons.

The U.S. Government ha.s reached
another difficult stage of the war in Vietnam.
It is reported, and I believe accurately,
that the decision has been made to send
additional troops to Vietnam. I do not
question the military basis upon which
the request for additional troops was
made. I do not question the desire and
duty of the President of the United States
and the Congress and the American people to protect our troops. And If the call
is made, I shall SUPport It as I have supported our troops In past years.
But these decisions deal with military
policy and with war, and implicit in them
1s the prospect of additional calls for
more men, more supplies, and more
bombing 1! the war continues.
All this may come, but before It does,
I urge our Government to take a pe.th
toward negotiations and pee.ce which I
do not believe has been fully tried-to
cease unconditionally the bombing of
North VIetnam. It bears rlsk-but one
that the strength of our country-great,
free, and humane--and the conscience of
our people compel us to take.
Some country someday, must show
the way from the morass of wars which
Is threatening our security and the peace
of the world. I do not know of any other
country that has the power, as well as
the obligation of leadership and the concern to lead the way, except the United
States. I hope that the United States will
lead the way.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, '1'\.111 the Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the Importance of the statement which the Senator
from Kentucky has made cannot be exaggerated. Because of Its Inherent soundness, It is something that the administration must take into account.
Mr. President, to my deep regret the
suggestion made by the Senator from
Kentucky and others, Including the majority leader, ha.s not been given consideration by the administration: or, if It
ha,s, we have not been advised that this
Is so.
I wish to emphasize this point as
strongly a.s I can by relating the colloquy
I had with the Secretary ot Defense a.t
a. hearing In which he was a witness befor the Committee on Foreign Relations,
as follows:
Senator CASE. Mr. Chalnnan, there Ia juat
one other thing, a.nd tha.t Ia with relation
to the bomblng. Bena.tor Cooper ha.a been
m.aklng suggeattona a.bout limitation of
bombing, and ma.ny other membt!rs or Congr668 have done tha~I use him a.a an example. I myself have stated that bombing
of North Vletnam ought to be limited to that
which haa a. substantial or significant t'ffect
upon the movement o! men or auppllt'a lnto
South Vletnam. The decision a.pparently hna
been made by the Administration to conttnue

raids."

Mr. President, I do not regard that
reply as a responsible response to the
suggestions made by the Senator from
Kentucky and many other Members o:
Congress.
If the Secretary of Defense feels, and
he may properly f!'el, that It Is beyond
his authority, competence, and what Is
appropriate and proper for him to talk
about, and that It should be the President.'s prerogative to make response to
this broad question-not about operations but about the broadest kind of
American POlicy-so be It; but in that
event It Is U1e President who must respond, and I hope he will.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator from
New Jersey. One must recognize the difference between what I propose and the
Senator from New Jersey proposes-and
question of mU!tary policy. We are talking about a way to determine if the war
can be ended.
Mr SYMINGTON. Mr. President, w!ll
the Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I am happy to yield to
my friend, the Senator from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the
able Senator from Kentucky knows of
my respect for him. Nevertheless, this
address of his creates certain apprehensions In my mind that are fortified
by a story in the press this afternoon
entitled "VC Using New Rocket." The
article states:
Ualng a new rocket wenpon, Oommunlst
guerrtlla.a today ltllled 11 Amerlcaru1 and
wounded 43 more In attacking a U.S. oomp
and B.lrtleld near SeJgon.
TI1e Vlet,oong wlthln 25 rnlnuteB slammed
137 shells Into the base. Military spokesmen
118old the Oommunlsls used mortnrs and 122
mm rockets, a new addition to the guerrilla
arsenal.
It hurls a SO-pound rocket 6 miles with
dl'adly aecuracy, the US. spokesm&n aald.

The rockets that have been killing so
many marines around Da Nang, 1t ts my
undprstanding, had a maximum range
of 4.3 miles.
THE Vlri'NAM WAlt

A SUGGES'I'ION

During the week before la.st, In Vietnam, U.S. casualties totaled 1,452, with
1.170 wounded, and 282 killed.
Nearly all Utese ca.sualt!es resulted
from weapons shipped direct from North
Vietnam to South VIetnam, or from
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North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia to South VIetnam.
Despite that fact, there 1s continued
Insistence, supported heartUy by the
Communist,s all over the world, that the
United States stop !t,s efforts to halt the
flow of this lethal equipment at the
source, by attacking mU!tary targets In
North Vietnam.
This opposition is centered In the
phrase "stop the bombing;" and the influence of the campaign that has centered around that phrase has resulted
ln much of our air and sea attack program being more a matter of "form"
than one of "substance."
The death of every young American In
combat is a sad and terrible business-a
life, with all Its promise for the future,
ended forever.
We have recently received class!fled
testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee which pointed out
that the ablllty of the North VIetnamese
to bring down their heavier artillery durIng the bombing pause Incident to the
Tet holiday caused the slaughter of many
of these young Americans; and we have
seen photographs, which are ava!lable to
any Senator, which proved lt.
It Is easier to direct this war from the
Senate floor than from the battle stations of our fighting men just south of
the DMZ, and all over South VIetnam.
Over here, however, except for certain
families, who grieve for the loss of their
loved ones, It is a fact that we are giving
up nothing; wherea.s over there, 12,000
young Americans have given up everything
It is hard to understand why there
would appear to be at least as much sol!cltude for the lives and safety of North
VIetnamese m!l1tary as against American
m!l1tary and the lives and safety of
young Americans who have been drafted
from their schools and colleges and jobs
by their Government, and who are fighting with superb courage for their country, 10,000 miles from home.
I do not know whether normal m!litary attacks against North VIetnam can
ever bring us any true "success" in this
long and major war. But I do !mow that,
unless the United States attempts to stop
at the source the guns coming down from
North Vietnam which are kUling Americans In South VIetnam, there Is no
chance whatever for any poos!ble success.
Incidentally, but pertinent to overall
thinking on this subject. the casualties
of our South VIetnam allies during that
same week totalled 556, whlch were less
than 40 percent of U.S. casualties.
After four trips to Vietnam, three of
them In the last 18 months, It Is my
belle! that the morale, the very fiber, of
the South VIetnamese people has, to a
considerable extent, withered away;
eroded by over a quarter of a. century of
almost cont!ImotL~ war-first with the
Japanese, then with the French, then
with ourselves and the South Koreans:
and
almost
continuously
among
themselves.
There are those who support the sending of more American ground forces to
South Vietnam. If we used the technological advantages of air and seapower,
however, instead of such concentration
on a ground war, based on my trips in
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the theater, I am convinced that ~
would have more chance for success with
less troops instead of more.
Based on the above. let me make this
suggestion this morning, 1f I may, Mr.
President, that instead of the constant
offer to have our Government stop air
attacks against North Vietnam as a preliminary to negotiation, we offer not only
to stop the fighting in North Vietnam,
but also the fighting in SOuth Vietnamand start negotiations from there.
Surely that action would give us a
better chance to attain these negotiations
and we could then apply at least part
of the appalllng cost of thls Vietnam
war-already some $70 mllllon a dayto our grave and growing problems here
at home.
Mr. President, I want to thank the able
Senator from Kentucky for yielding to
me.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia subsequently
said: Mr. President, a few moments ago
the distlngulshed Senator from Missouri
mentioned the casualties of the United
States Forces and the South Vietnam
forces.
As I recall, he gave the figures for 1
week. I would Ilk·~ to expand those figures and give at this point the figures
for the first 5 months of 1967.
In the first 5 months of 1967, the U.S.
combat casualties totaled 31,036 kJlled
and wounded.
In -that same period the South Vietnamese casualties totaled 17,003.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have
listened carefully to the remarks of the
distlngulshed Senator from Missouri, but
I must say that we are discussing different approaches to a solution of the war.
In a way, he made a strong argument
for the proposal I am making. I have
said that everyone knows that should
there be a cessation of the bombing it
would entail risks; the poSBibility of the
introduction of additional forces and
supplies from North Vietnam. But with
the great strength we have in ground
forces, and air forces, concentrating on
those points where infiltration routes
enter South Vietnam, I cannot see that
the security of our forces will be threatened any more than they are now. On
the other hand-the cessation may lead
to peace and greater security for our
troops.
I recall that it was in February or
March of 1965 the bombing began. I believe we had 24,000 men in Vietnam at
the time. There was no great movement
of either men or supplies into South
Vietnam. But as we have stepped up
bombing, the entry of troops and supplies into South Vietnam has increased.
The movement of supplies and men into
South Vietnam has not been stopped by
the bombing.
The Senator from Missouri speaks
about-and rightfully ~f concern for
those who fight. All of us have concern
for our men in Vietnam. It is the greatest
concern of all.
The chief ·reason I have continued to
make thls propooal is because of concern
for those who fight, who are wounded,
and who die. The present rate of casualties today, could reach 75,000 a year.
The Senator and I are not talking about

the same thing. Of course, if we want to
apply every bit of force we have upoo
North Vletnam, and some would use
nuclear weapons, we could destroy NOrth
Vietnam. I have made roy propooal because I do not believe there has been an
unconditional cessation of bombing.
I propose tt again to determine if it
will open negotiations. I propose it as a
movement toward a honorable peace.
If negotiations do not follow, the President of the United States has the inherent power, under the Constitution,
to take whatever steps he needs to protect
our troops.
Mr. MANSFIF..LD. Mr President, will
the Senator from Kentucky yield?
Mr. COOPER. I am happy to yield to
the Senator from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have listened with
interest, and I have read with interest,
the speech just made by the distinguished
Senator from Kentucky. I want to commend him for making hls views known
once again He has a perfect right to
speak out as he does, as every Senator
has. When we speak out, it does not
mean we are planning the strategy of
the war iri Vietnam. The President has
that responsibillty as Chief of State and
as Commander in Chief.
But, may I point out that every Senator from every State likewise has a
responsibility, and the place to make hls
views known is on the floor of the Senate
in full and open view.
May I say to the distinguished Senator
from New Jersey-and I think I can say
thls without fear of contradiction-that
all proposals which have been made or
suggested here have been given serious
consideration in the executive branch of
the Government.
The Senator from Kentucky states
that the chief issue before the country
continues to be Vietnam. It is the overriding issue. While, for the time being,
the situation in our urban areas and
major cities is of prime importance, even
there, in roy opinion, the shadow of Vietnam extends.
As I listened to the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, it
appeared to me that what he has said in
effect, this time, is what he said on May
15. The only difference is that he has
gone into more detail. But, as I recall the
Cooper formula proposed on the floor ot
the Senate on the 15th of May, it was to
confine the bombing to the Ho Chi Minh
trails around the 17th parallel.
Thus, what he said then he is now saying again : This is one way to confine the
war to South Vietnam.
I have assumed all along that our chief
objective in Vietnam was to maintain the
st ablllty, the integrity, and · the independence of South Vietnam, period.
Thls is one way in which more success
can be achieved, in my opinion, than can
be achieved by the continued bombing of
the north where, I believe, our forces
are rapidly running out of targets.
What was the bombing of the north
supposed to accomplish? It had two objectives. One, either to stop or decrease
1nfiltration of men and material along
the Ho Chi Minh trails, and, two, to
bring Hanoi to the conference table. In
both respects, those objectives have not
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been attained. There are more men and
more tons of material coming down from
the north than WBII the case before the
bombing started, or at least before It
achieved proportions of great s!gn:lficance.
As far as bringing Hanoi to the conference table is concerned, in roy considered opinion, it is farther away from
that table than ever before. You cannot
bomb those people into submission. You
cannot return them to the stone age, because they are living in conditions not
very far from it. They will dictate the
kind of war which will be followed.
whether tt be conventional or guerrllla.
They have been dictating the kind of
war and when it is to be fought. They
have fought it all too often at the t1me
and place of their own choice.
What have we accomplished with our
search-and-destroy tactics? We have
taken, for a time, control of a part of
their territory, but after we do that, we
go back to our bases. There is even a
question of doubt as to how secure our
bases are. I would recall what happened
last week, when a very small number of
mortars shelled Da Nang. I read in the
papers that our losses ranged from $60
million to $80 million.
The Senator from Kentucky also perfonns ·a service for the country when he
points out what the possible potentials
in this war are if it keeps going on, escalating step by step, gradually or otherwise.
I am taking too much of the Senator's
t1me. All I want to say is I think, once
again, as he has many times, the Senator
has performed a public service.
Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. COOPER. I ask unanimous consent that I may have 10 additional
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COOPER. I yield to the Senator
from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I merely wish to
associate myself with what the Senator
from Montana, the distinguished majority leader, has said, in commending
the Senator from Kentucky. I read his
speech with a great deal of interest. I
join in hls recommendation to stop the
bombing. Thls subject has been discussed at considerable length by the
Senator from Kentucky in a slightly different context, but the purpose Is still
the same, I think; it is to try to bring the
war to an honorable end.
I only say, with respect to the comments of the Senator from Missouri, 1f
he knows of any way to approach a cessation of the fighting, I will join in that,
too. The principal purpose of stopping
the bombing is to set the stage for negotiations which would leave both parties
in an acceptable oolitical posture. That
Is the purpose of negotiations.
I think the Senator from Kentucky
and I wish to bring about the same objective. It is a question of how to bring
it about. I think the Senator from Kentucky is correct in pointing out that we
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have never had an unconditional cessation of bombing, We have never given a
bona ftde te6t as to what the Intentions
of North Vietnam are. We do not know
what they would really do if there were
a cessation of the bombing, without the
specific conditions such as have been
mentioned on many occasions. I would
like to see us try it.
I would also like to have a cease-fire, if
someone would show me how to get it.
That Is what was negotiated tn 1954,
when the French and the Vietnamese
were In agreement that the fighting
should stop. I do not want to quibble
about the methods that would promote a
cessation of this war, but I think the
Senator from Kentucky is most logical
when he says we can do this without anyone's agreement. We cannot get a ceasefire without an agreement on the other
side. We can cease the bombing without
obtalntng anyone's permission and see
what the other side will do.
So I commend the Senator from Kentucky. I hope that this suggestion might
reach the executive branch of the Government.
Mr. COOPER. I did not talk about a
cease-fire or the subject matter of negotiations, because I desired to emphasize
the step that could lead to negotiations.
As the Senator has said, this action is
within our control.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, w111 the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. AIKEN. I Just want to say the
Senator from Kentucky has given us a
display of a commodity which is all too
scarce In the world today, and I mean
statesmanship. There is nothing dishonorable about wanting to bring this war
1n Southeast Asia to a close. I think
President Johnson would be fully warranted 1n taking heed of what the Senator from Kentucky has said today,
How has our policy worked over there?
We were supposed to bring the war to
a quick end when the bombing of North
Vietnam started. In fact, eome of our
m11ltary experts thought It would be only
a matter of a few days before the North
Vietnamese leadership would be on Its
knees seeking a conference at the table.
It baa not worked just that way.
Coincident with the start of the bombing of North VIetnam came the Introduction of more modern and e:t'Hclent
weapons on the part of the enemy. We
have had a very painful experience as a
result. By the end of this year, our casualties, killed and wounded, will undoubtedly reach 100,000 most of which
will have been Incurred since the bombIng of North ' Vietnam started they
might have been considered of minor
proportions up to that tlm&-and we are
st111 fighting In the same places we were
when we started that bombing-a.~ the
Senator from Missouri said, 4 miles from
Da Nang and about the same distance
from Saigon and our other bases In
South VIetnam.
We get optimistic reports and predictions every little while, and they never
come true. Only the other day, top officials of our Government assured us we
w're making progress and alm06t the
next day we got a report that one of our

air

.
bases ha.d been attacked by modern

weapons and possibly $100 m1111on damage was done to our A1r Force 1n a
single attack.
I might say that when we follow a
policy that does not work and has not
worked, then It is time perhaps to try
something else, such as the Senator from
Kentucky has advocated. There Is no
use saying that President Ho Chi Minh
\s not sick of this war. He would not be
human if he were not sick of it. It Is
also a good guess to say that he and
most of his countrymen would rather
die than get down on their knees and
beg.
So I do hope the President will take
heed of what the Senator from Kentucky
has sugiested, not only today, but a
number of times. It would be no disgrace
for the United States to seek to bring this
war to an end.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I should
like to join Senators on bo•.h sides of the
aisle 1n commending the Senator from
Kentucky on the speech he has made
today. I agree completely with everything he has said.
It Is dimcult to quarrel with a colleague, particularly when he is a former
Secretary of the Air Force, but I find
myself in disagreement with some of
the points made by our colleague, the
Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON),
a few moments ago.
He was, of course, Secretary of the Air
Force. It was my privilege to have served
for 4. years In that branch of the
service during the war, attalntng the
rank of colonel; but I do not pretend to
have any particular competence with
respect to the utilization of air power
at the prCI\ent time.
I must say, however, as an observer
who did serve In the Air Force for 4
years, that 1n my opinion the bombing
has been counterproductive and has had
very little to do with saving the lives of
any young Americans. If lives are saved
by bombing, they can still be saved, 1n
my opinion, by bombing south of the
17th parallel.
On March 31, I 11Ulde statements quite
simllar to those which the Senator from
Kentucky has made today. On April 3,
at the unanimous-consent request of the
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Senator from Arkansas
I Mr. FuLBRICBrl, my speech was printed
In the RECORD. Secretary General U
Thant publicly espoused the recommendations that I made, which were as follows:
First. Cease the bombing of North
VIetnam.
Second. Cea.~ all offensive operations
l.n South Vietnam, firing only 1f fired
upon,
Third. Induce General Ky's forces to
do the same.
I returned to the same subject on May
16, In connection with the occasion of
Buddha's birthday, making the 116me
proposals. Those proposals have never
been acknowledged nor commented upon
by the executive branch of the Government.
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I ask my friend from Kentucky this
question: Does he not believe that the
cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, while It might very well result In
negotiations with Hanoi, iB not too likely
to have the effect of achieving negotiations with the Vietcong; and Is It not
necessary that 1! we make a peace gesture toward Hanoi, we should also make
a similar peace gesture toward the Vietcong?
My suggestion would be that If we
announced publicly we would fire only
when fired upon, at least until we had
an opportunity to determine whether the
leadership of the Vietcong was interested
In arranging a cease-fire, and would stop
the search and destroy technique which
Is costing the lives of so many young
Americans and causing so many others
to be wounded, we would then have a
comprehensive plan which In my opinion
would have a better chance of success;
for I am not convinced, and I wonder
whether the Senator from Kentucky is
convinced, that Hl\nol completely domInates the Vietcong.
Mr. COOPER. No, I do not think Hanoi
completely dominates the Vietcong. The
Vietcong were active for many yean before the war expanded.
I have addressed myself to North Vietnam, because North VIetnam, In every
proposal, has made as Its central point
the unconditional cessation of bombing.
As we all know from our own sources,
their proposals have changed at times
but always this has been the central
point.
I shall confine myself to tlie question that I have raised this a.fternoon
I do recall that the Senator from Pennsylvania, has suggested the same proposal.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I had
the privilege of reading the speech of
the Senator from Kentucky, which he
furnished to me before he gave it. I read
It with considerable Interest and care.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senator
from Kentucky may have 5 a.dd!t!onal
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.
Mr. DOMINICK. I must say, though
I would like to agree with the Senator,
that I find myself unable completely to
agree. I say this because It seems to me
that his proposal is predicated upon the
Idea that North VIetnam wants peace,
while there has been no sign of any kind
that North Vietnam wants either to negotiate or to cut down Its rate of infiltration Into South Vietnam, or to otherwise approach the peace table.
We have probably made the most extensive effort to find a method of sitting
down at a table with the North Vietnamese that any country has ever made
In time of war, nnd we have been unable
to find any poss!bll!ty whereby they will
even sit down and discuss the matter.
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I was in South Vietnam and Thailand
in May. There was certainly no indication then that the North Vietnamese
were moving in a direction which would
cut down on their involvement in South
Vietnam. As a matter of fact, during one
of the holidays, we were informed by
both intelligence and diplomatic sources,
and by our ministry-I was personally
so informed-that the road south looked
like the Los Angeles freeway on New
Year's Day; that when we stopped the
bombing, truckload after truckload and
convoy after convoy, which up to that
time had been held back and were only
dribbling through at night, were coming
down, with vast sources of supplies and
equipment to be put into South Vietnam.
In addition to the 112-millimeter rocket
which has been talked about by the distinguished Senator from Missouri, there
were 144-millimeter rockets, now being
made available by the Russians, which
are capable of going 7 miles or more
before they hit.
I would say there was no indication
under any circumstances that they
would be willing to seek peace. If we stop
our bombing-and this 1s what concerns
me most--without having at least some
kind of word that they are willing to
stop and sit down and see how we can
find peace; if we stop without even that
assurance, it strikes me that what we
will be doing is experimenting with the
position of our troops in South VIetnam.
That is why, much as I should like
to, I am unable to agree with the Senator
from Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the distinguished
Senator from Colorado.
As he has said, there has not been any
open or public indication upon the part
of North Vietnam to negotiate. We know
that the President of the United States
has undertaken many courses to try to
get to the table.
But this being true, I have asked that
before we start on another stage of increased; buildup of forces, of increased
bombing, Increased casualties, of increased costs, all of which are not bringing the war to a close, we should see If the
one requirement made again and again
by North Vietnam, the unconditional
cessation of bombing, will lead to negotiations and peace.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
have :Wtened to this debate this afternoon with a great deal of interest. It 1s
well that the different points of view
held by various Senators be brought
forth. I appreciate the candor and the
frankness of the distinguished Senator
from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON]; I
appreciate the reasoning and the
thoughts behind the words of the distinguished Senator from Colorado [Mr.
DoMINICK]. It 1s obvious that there are
divergencies of opinion. But I believe
that what we must face up t<- is that
either we have to seek to find new ways
of reaching the negotiating table, or face
the prospect of escalating still further.
There are not many more targets outside of Haiphong and Hanoi and per-

haps a few targets further north. If we
are to continue to escalate, we had better
count the costs involved-the cost to us
In manpower, and how long it will take,
what It may mean in the way of possible
confrontation with China and perhaps
the Soviet Union and other "socialist"
states.
I appreciate what the distinguished
Senator had to say about a proposal
which I made about taking up the U.S.
resolution Introduced in January 1966 in
the Security Council, seeking to bring
all the participants, both direct and Indirect, to New York, for the purpose of
laying the cards on the table. When I
speak of Indirect participants and direct
participants, I mean Peking and the
Vletcong-the NLF, the political arm.
They both have to be considered, in my
opinion, before this war 1s concluded.
I say most respectfully to the Senator
that perhaps it will not be one formula
alone which will bring this war to a conclusion. At the least, it will be a consolidated and concentrated effort in
South Vietnam. If the Cooper proposal
Is followed, there is also a call for a proposal to continue the defense perimeter
just below the demilitarization zone, below the 17th parallel-of which I understand 11 miles has been built or cleared
and an additional 12 miles 1s in the
process of being constructed-that would
take us more than half way across the
17th .Parallel dividing North and South
VIetnam. If that could be done, if the
Cooper formula could be followed, and
if the U.S. resolution to the United Nations could be called up, followed up and
voted on, perhaps there would be a possibility of finding a small pathway to a
road which might lead towards negotiations and peace.
We cannot afford to let down In a
constant effort to reach the negotiating
table.
I assure the Senate and the Senator
that as far as the President of the United States is concerned he is just as desirous as 1s anyone In this body of reaching
the negotiating table to the end that this
brutal and dirty war can be brought to
an honorable conclusion.
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